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SC-06595-56 Series A

INTRODER PLICETS OVER THE USER DURING JULY 1956

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10th JULY

- 20. Soviet and satellite radar tracking on the last day was very confused. It looks as though there must have been one main intruder flight which began over SAXONY, crossed southern POLAND and entered the USSR west of L'VOV, whence it flew south-westwards to ODESSA then wouth of NIKONEV and across the northern CRIMEA into the Sea of AZOV. It returned by flying round the sourthern coast of the CRIMEA back to ODESSA and then across ROUMANIA, HUNGARY, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA into SAXONY and thence to BAVARIA.
- The actural tracking available is, however, very broken and there were some changes of track number. The aircraft first detected on this suggested route 'track 4540') did in fact turn back westward when just north of DRESDEN, but it should be noted that itwas at this time (0751) that the designation of this track was changed from or "two or more" aircraft. It is therefore possible that a group of two or more divided at this point and that the part which continued eastward was undected until 9845.



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- 22. Track 8524 (Polish track number was described as "two or more unidentified aircraft" until 0851 when the number was changed to 7473, (taken from the Czech blokk) but the description was not donfirmed as two or more intruder aircraft until 0910 when the track crossed the Sov frontier; and then from 0949 to the end of the track the description was subsequently given as "one" aircraft. The same track number was retained to the end except for a short periord after a failure to maintain continuity over the CRIMEA.
- 23. At 1203, when the aircraft was re-crossing from the USSR to ROUMANIA there was an apparent splitting of the track. If this is to be accepte at its face value it would imply that more than one aircraft had in fact made the flight across the SOVIET UNION: but it will be seen from the map that the distance from the plot at 1203 to the first plot of the southern branch of track 7473 at 1206

is too great for the time allowed whereas the first plot of the northern branch at 1212 is a more probably distance away. Furthermor, the southern branch co-incides in due course with a track 4601 (Roumanian block) not only in position but also in height (12,000 metres) and this may therefore have been mistakenly identifed as the intruder. This error was never admitted in the traffic available although Toumanian sources began to broadcast what was probably the correct track of the intruder from 2212. Broadcasts outside Roumania which had already begun to repeat the probably erroneous track did not begin to repeat the northern track until 1220. The Roumanian Air Situation Broadcast adone attributed to track 7473 the plots from 1228 to 1237 and the MOSCOW broadcasts alone attributed them to track 4601. After this confusion had been resolved the track was followed without a break until it faded over Western GERMANY.

- 24. Heights at the beginning of the flight were estimated at from 14,000 to 17,000 metres but later on height estimated of 18 and 19,000 metres were common and there were a few of 20,000 metres over CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
- 25. Very little tracking was reported which could represent serious attempts at interception. There was a track 6642 (BLACK EXECUTED LANGE AND LAN
- 26. At 9955 on this day as unreadable message in a fighter code (RUJWO-1), which included a reference to the intruder track was sent to MOSCOW ON THE Air Situation Broadcast from BUCHAREST

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FIGHTER CODE TRAFFIC

27. Fighter code traffic referring to track numbers 4513 on 4th, July, 4547 on 5th July and 4545 on 9th July was exchanged between KAUNAS/KARMELAVA and HQ BALTIC A.D.D. on a net of unidentified function. The msgs were not readable so it is not known what what active air defence measures were contemplated or attempted in this area. No relevant air/ ground fighter voice traffic was interceipted.

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